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 An Institutional Perspective on Corporate Control
 and the Network of Interlocking Directorates
 Julie A. Caswell
 The network of contacts between individuals in positions of power in
 the corporate system can be approached from two separate but comple-
 mentary perspectives. The first views the network as a sociological phe-
 nomenon-as a system for socializing members or potential members of
 the upper class in those skills and attitudes necessary for replication of the
 current system. The second perspective sees the network as a pragmatic
 means to an economic end, the end being higher profits in the corporate
 sector and the means being the exchange of information and coordination
 of policy between members of the system.
 The coexistence of distinct but heavily overlapping networks of contact
 parallels these perspectives. Networks of contact established through at-
 tendance at exclusive preparatory schools and colleges and through mem-
 bership in select social and civic organizations may primarily serve the
 first function of socialization and generation of group cohesiveness [Dom-
 hoff 1967, pp. 12-37]. Corporate interlocking directorates may primarily
 serve the second function of coordinating activity and arbitrating conflict
 in order to enhance corporate profit performance. Private policy planning
 groups such as the Conference Board may, on the other hand, serve both
 socialization and coordination functions [Dye 1978].
 The major issue of interest in study of these networks is whether their
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 existence constitutes evidence that control over corporate and government
 decision making is centralized. In other words, the issue is whether elitist
 or pluralist views of the organization of our institutions are correct. This
 article focuses on the implications for corporate control of one of these
 networks of contact, the system of corporate interlocking directorates. At
 the same time, it attempts to integrate network analysis with the large
 body of work on direct control of corporations through stockholding.
 Control in the Corporate Sector
 Analysis of corporate control has followed two mostly separate tracks.
 The first looks at direct control over corporate decision making through
 stockholding or stockholding combined with representation on boards of
 directors [Berle and Means 1932; Larner 1970; Kotz 1978]. On this actor
 level, control is conceptualized as a dyadic, hierarchic relationship be-
 tween two firms, a firm and a family or individual, or a firm and a financial
 institution. The body of literature developed on management control is
 on this level of analysis. The striking features of this approach is its treat-
 ment of the firm as an independent entity operating free of centers of con-
 trol outside its management and stockholders. As such it is consistent with
 the bulk of economic analysis that also assumes independent, albeit in
 some cases collusive, decision making by firms.
 The second track of analysis conceptualizes control as being exercised
 through a network of relationships between firms. Authors using this ap-
 proach argue that a firm's individual one-to-one relationships can be
 properly analyzed only in the context of the entire set of relationships
 maintained by the firm and all other firms in the relevant network [Bearden
 et al. 1975, pp. 24-29; Mizruchi 1982, p. 52]. The network of relation-
 ships used to study corporate control is commonly the set of interlocking
 directors, since the board of directors has the power to exercise control
 over the corporation.
 Direct control is a familiar concept to economists and study of it has
 been extensive. The focus of this research has been to ascertain who ex-
 ercises control, primarily through stockholding, over the decision mak-
 ing process within the large firms that dominate the U.S. economy. In
 the early 1900s, this control was widely believed to be held by a "Money
 Trust" of large financiers [Brandeis 1914; Moody 1919]. Adolph A. Berle
 and Gardiner C. Means introduced the idea of a managerial revolution
 when they suggested in the 1930s that management discretion was in-
 creasing as stockholding in large firms became more dispersed [Berle and
 Means 1932]. Studies done in the 1960s and 1970s have variously found
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 high levels of managerial control [Larner 1970], family control [Burch
 1972], and financial control [Kotz 1978]. Even though the diverse re-
 search methodologies and samples used by these authors have yielded
 mixed results, the conventional wisdom has remained that, by and large,
 management control is widespread among large firms in the United States.
 The suspected dominance of management control has lead to a strong
 interest in the motivations and business strategies of managers versus
 owners. Numerous studies of the most widely discussed hypothesis, that
 owner-controlled firms are more profitable than those controlled by man-
 agement, have not found consistent evidence in its support [Bothwell 1980,
 pp. 303-305]. This is not surprising for two reasons. The first, not pursued
 here, is that the studies may show no difference between the groups be-
 cause there is a high level of miscategorization of firms by control type.
 In particular, in cases where limited data are available on family or finan-
 cial control, firms that do have centers of control may be mistakenly cate-
 gorized as management-controlled [Burch 1972].
 The second explanation is that information on direct control is insuf-
 ficient in itself to assess the control a firm is under. Firms operate in an
 environment made up of direct holders as well as other firms and institu-
 tions that may have financial or business relationships with the firm and
 may have board representation. As linkages between families and firms
 are assessed in the context of a network of relationships, control is clearly
 relative to how many actors are involved in a decision, the degree of their
 interest, and how much influence they are willing to exercise. The process
 of corporate decision making is, therefore, analogous to political decision
 making, where "interest groups" vie for control over corporate resources.
 It is also analogous in that certain parties to the decision may have the
 power necessary to determine the outcome regardless of opposition. A
 family-controlled firm with no debt, for example, may be able to make its
 decisions without consultation with other parties while a highly leveraged
 management-controlled firm may have its scope of action severely limited
 by loan covenants.
 The network analysis techniques used in the study of interlocking direc-
 torates are not generally familiar to economists. This is probably a result
 of the focus of economic analysis on competitive relationships. Such rela-
 tionships assume the independence of the actors involved. Network re-
 lationships such as those represented by the system of interlocking di-
 rectors form an institutional superstructure within which market level
 competition or rivalry occurs. As such they form a nexus between com-
 petition and coordination and point to extramarket mechanisms that affect
 economic performance.
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 The major difficulty in using interlocking directorships to study control
 of corporate decision making is that their function and content are vari-
 able and basically unverifiable. As with networks of social, civic, and
 political ties, the network of interlocking directorates is a complex insti-
 tution that serves several functions simultaneously. Since business decision
 making and board meetings are not public, outsiders can gain only hearsay
 information on internal corporate matters from the business press. Thus
 direct evaluation of the effects of this network are not possible. Its longev-
 ity and stability, however, argue for its importance and the need to study
 network forms of control [Dooley 1969, p. 322; Allen 1974, p. 404; Bunt-
 ing 1976, pp. 28-32; Mizruchi 1982, pp. 177-78].
 The Function and Content of Interlocking Directorates
 The study of interlocking directorates as an institution of corporate
 control requires the development of a conceptual framework outlining
 their function and content. The legislative history of Section 8 of the Clay-
 ton Act of 1914, which restricts interlocking directorates, indicates that
 the major concern raised by the practice of interlocking directors was its
 effect on business decision making and the level of competition between
 firms [Kramer 1950; Halverson 1976]. These ties were, therefore, viewed
 as indicative of alliances or control relationships between corporations as
 well as the means of carrying them out. Work done since the 1930s has
 broadened the issues addressed in studies of interlocking directors and
 system level control from what can be characterized as concerns with
 maintenance of competition to issues of the existence and replication of
 an elite class within American society.
 Three authors recently have presented typologies of the possible con-
 tent and function of interlocking directorates [Koenig, Gogel, and Son-
 quist 1979, pp. 174-77; Mizruchi 1982, pp. 34-44; Palmer 1983, pp. 40-
 42]. A synthesis of these typologies yields five basic approaches to the
 study of interlocking directorates. The first approach constitutes the null
 hypothesis: exchange of directors is not significant because board mem-
 bers are figureheads in the governance of firms. Control over the firm rests
 with management, which chooses outside directors based on friendship or
 prestige factors. In this view, linkages through interlocking directors have
 no content and serve secondary or basically frivolous functions.
 A second approach views exchange of directors as a sociological phe-
 nomenon. The system of interlocking directors is seen as a means of con-
 solidating and maintaining general control over the corporate sector by
 an upper class of American society. Interlocks are not important as rela-
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 tionships between specific firms, but as a diffuse set of social relations
 that facilitates formation of group consensus and socializes new members
 of the class [Koenig, Gogel, and Sonquist 1979, pp. 176-77]. The content
 of intercorporate personnel ties is, therefore, relationships between upper-
 class individuals and their function is to buttress general upper-class con-
 trol.
 The three remaining approaches emphasize economic motivations for
 intercorporate ties. In each case, one or the other or both of the firms
 involved seek contact with the other firm in order to advance their eco-
 nomic interests. Mark Mizruchi labels these three approaches coordina-
 tion, cooptation, and control. [Mizruchi 1982]. The basic differences
 between them is in the conceptualization of the power relationships be-
 tween the firms. From the coordination perspective, interlocking directors
 are a means of harmonizing policy for mutual benefit. The important char-
 acteristic of these types of ties is their reciprocal nature-the parties are
 involved in a non-hierarchical relationship. The content of interlocking
 directorates, from this perspective, is ties between firms that have regular
 exchange or market contact with each other and the function is to co-
 ordinate mutually beneficial policy.
 The remaining two paradigms view interlocks as hierarchical relation-
 ships. The cooptation or resource dependency paradigm, relying on a
 management control perspective, views the firm as an independent entity
 under management direction that actively seeks to place on its board
 people affiliated with other firms that control resources crucial to its op-
 eration. These people are coopted in the sense that their intimate contact
 with the firm makes it possible for the management to gain their support
 and cooperation. In contrast to the coordination view, the relationship is
 hierarchical in that only one member of the pair is active and powerful
 while the other subordinates its interests to some degree. The content of
 interlocking directors is again ties between firms that have a regular ex-
 change or market contact, but the function is to allow one firm to be more
 effective through cooptation of the other.
 The final perspective views intercorporate ties as a control relationship
 through which one firm dictates or influences the other firm's policies for
 its own benefit. The relationship is hierarchical, as with cooptation, but
 the flow of influence is assumed to be in the opposite direction. The same
 relationship can often be interpreted from both perspectives. For ex-
 ample, Donald R. Grangaard was president, chief executive officer, and
 director of First Bank System, Inc. (Minneapolis) in 1976. He was also
 a director of George A. Hormel & Company. This interlock can be viewed
 alternatively as a move by Hormel to coopt First Bank System, a source
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 of capital, or as a move by First Bank System to place its representative
 on Hormel's board to monitor and influence corporate policy.
 From the standpoint of economic analysis, the last three perspectives
 are most relevant. Although the system of interlocking directorates un-
 doubtedly serves to generate cohesiveness within the upper class in the
 United States and this may have indirect effects on economic performance,
 the possible market-level coordinating effects of this network have more
 direct implications for performance. The magnitude of these effects de-
 pends on the structure and strength of ties between firms. If ties tend to be
 dyadic and each firm has only a few such ties, the overall effect will prob-
 ably be less than if groups of firms are closely interlocked regardless of
 whether one views the ties as serving a coordination, cooptation, or con-
 trol function. On the other hand, whether the tie is hierarchic (reflects
 the ability of one firm to direct the other's policy) is also an important
 determinant of how much impact the network of interlocking directors
 will have on market behavior.
 For development of an analytical base for research on interlocking di-
 rectorates it is probably not necessary to choose between the coordination,
 cooptation, and control paradigms. This is especially true since some pro-
 portion of these ties likely fit each of the three paradigms. A useful per-
 spective growing out of these approaches is that interlocks reflect working
 relationships between firms and are pursued in order to establish regular
 forums for exchange of information. The strength of influence in many
 cases is such that it constitutes a control relationship in which firms cease
 to be independent decision making centers.
 Direct and Network Corporate Control
 Patterns of corporate control indicate the degree of centralization of
 economic, political, and social power in the United States. Clearly, the
 less diffuse this power is, the less competitive and democratic our system.
 Analysis of the level of centralization requires data on both direct and
 network control and its integration into an overall control picture.
 Direct control of individual corporations through stockholding and re-
 lated board representation is the widely researched level of the control
 structure. The findings indicate a shifting distribution of owner, financial,
 and management control over time. These results shed light on the power
 structure of intra-corporate decision making and have implications for
 the independence of that decision making.
 Inferences on the structure of control drawn at the level of direct con-
 trol alone, however, are misleading. In particular, the absence of direct
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 control does not indicate that network forms of control will also be absent.
 On the contrary, recent research on patterns of control in the agribusiness
 sector indicates that strong direct control is associated with the absence
 of network ties through interlocking directors while firms without strong
 centers of control (the so-called management-controlled firms) have
 higher levels of network ties [Caswell 1984]. This line of reasoning leads
 to the conclusion that the managerial revolution may be more properly
 thought of as a shift in the locus of control to a higher institutional level
 of control [Bunting and Mizruchi 1982].
 A corollary to the argument that the presence of this type of network
 level control or influence implies less dispersion of control than is other-
 wise recognized is that conventional measures of aggregate concentration
 in the economy are understated. Yet, the system of corporate interlocking
 directors is only one facet of the network of interpersonal and intercorpo-
 rate ties between people and firms in positions of power within the U.S.
 system. Analysis of those institutions of control is an essential element in
 understanding the functioning of economic markets as well as govern-
 mental, education, and social processes. A useful analytical approach to
 the study of control in the corporate sector is to distinguish between pat-
 terns of direct and network control and build a paradigm that integrates
 the findings of each.
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